Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs), that is, Answer Set Programming (ASP) extended with epistemic operators, have received renewed interest in recent years, which led to a flurry of new research, as well as efficient solvers. An important question is under which conditions a sub-program can be replaced by another one without changing the meaning, in any context. This problem is known as strong equivalence, and is well-studied for ASP. For ELPs, this question has been approached by embedding them into epistemic extensions of equilibrium logics. In this paper, we consider a simpler, more direct characterization that is directly applicable to the language used in state-of-the-art ELP solvers. This also allows us to give tight complexity bounds, showing that strong equivalence for ELPs remains coNP-complete, as for ASP. We further use our results to provide syntactic characterizations for tautological rules and rule subsumption for ELPs.
Introduction
Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs) are an extension of the well-established formalism of Answer Set Programming (ASP), a generic, fully declarative logic programming language that allows for encoding problems such that the resulting answers (called answer sets) directly correspond to solutions of the encoded problem (Brewka, Eiter, and Truszczynski 2011; Schaub and Woltran 2018) . Negation in ASP is generally interpreted according to the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) , that is, as negation-as-failure, also called default negation. Such a default negation ¬a of an atom a is true if there is no justification for a in the same answer set, making it a "local" operator in the sense that it is defined relative to one considered answer set. ELPs (in the version of (Shen and Eiter 2016) ), on the other hand, extend ASP with the epistemic negation operator not that allows for a form of meta-reasoning, that is, reasoning over multiple answer sets. Intuitively, an epistemically negated atom not a expresses that a cannot be proven true, meaning that it is not true in every answer set. Thus, epistemic negation is defined relative to a collection of answer sets, referred to as a world view. Deciding whether a world view exists, is Σ Gelfond (1991; 1994) recognized epistemic negation as a desired construct for ASP early on and introduced the modal operators K ("known" or "provably true") and M ("possible" or "not provably false") to address this. Ka and Ma correspond to ¬not a and not ¬a, respectively. Renewed interest in recent years has revealed several flaws in the original semantics, and various new approaches (cf. e.g. (Gelfond 2011; Truszczynski 2011; Kahl 2014;  Fariñas del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015; Shen and Eiter 2016)) were proposed. Also the development of ELP solving systems (Kahl et al. 2015; Son et al. 2017; Bichler, Morak, and Woltran 2018) has gained momentum.
A main application and major motivation of ELPs is the formalization of the Closed World Assumption (CWA), as pointed out already by Gelfond (1991) . Interestingly, there are two formalizations of the CWA using ELPs in the literature. The first, given in (Gelfond 1991) 1 , shall be referred to as Gelfond-CWA and introduces one rule for each atom p:
Intuitively, this says that p ′ (i.e. the negation of p) shall be true if there is no possible world where p is true. Shen and Eiter (2016) propose a different rule for CWA, which we will refer to as Shen-Eiter-CWA for p:
Again, intuitively, this formulation makes p ′ true iff there is a possible world where p is false.
A natural question is whether (1) and (2) yield the same results in any context, which will be answered in this paper. To this end, we study notions of equivalence between ELPs. For instance, two ELPs Π 1 and Π 2 are strongly ELP-WVequivalent iff, for any third ELP Π, the combined programs Π 1 ∪ Π and Π 2 ∪ Π are equivalent (i.e. have the same world views). This notion is useful to transform ELPs into equivalent versions where one wants to verify that a local change preserves equivalence without considering the whole program. Other notions of strong equivalence can be defined for comparing candidate world views (rather than world views) or considering only the addition of programs that do not contain epistemic operators. In (plain) ASP, strong equivalence is a well-studied problem. Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde (2001) have provided an elegant characterization of the problem in terms of Heyting's logic of here-and-there (HT). Strong equivalence also proved useful as a means to simplify programs (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007; Lin and Chen 2007; Eiter et al. 2013) .
It has been shown in (Wang and Zhang 2005) and (Fariñas del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015) , among others, that epistemic extensions of logic HT can be used to characterize strong equivalence of ELPs. These approaches, however, are very general and lead to a very abstract characterization that cannot be immediately used for ELPs written in the language of current solving systems. It is also not easy to obtain tight complexity results in such a general setting. The semantics considered in (Wang and Zhang 2005) is the original one of (Gelfond 1991) , which is now considered obsolete, while (Fariñas del Cerro, Herzig, and Su 2015) consider a different semantics from the one in (Shen and Eiter 2016) , which is what we use. An in-depth comparison of the differences in the semantics can also be found in (Shen and Eiter 2016) .
In this paper, we therefore propose a simpler, more direct characterization for the well-understood ELP semantics given in (Shen and Eiter 2016) . Our characterization is in the spirit of (Turner 2003) , which is useful to study ELPs written in the input language of the ELP solvers mentioned above, as it can be directly applied in this setting. This also allows us to obtain tight complexity bounds for checking strong equivalence of ELPs. We further investigate several use cases of strong equivalence by using our technique to syntactically characterize tautological rules and rule subsumptions.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• We propose different notions of strong equivalence of ELPs (based on the input language of ELP solvers) that strictly generalize strong equivalence for plain ASP.
• We provide a model-theoretic characterization of strong equivalence for ELPs showing that the different notions proposed coincide.
• We use our characterization to show that, surprisingly, testing strong equivalence of two ELPs remains in CONP, that is, the complexity of this test does not increase when considering ELPs instead of plain ASP.
• Finally, we use our proposed notion to syntactically characterize tautological ELP rules and when one ELP rule subsumes another.
Preliminaries
Answer Set Programming (ASP). A ground logic program with nested negation (also called answer set program, ASP program, or, simply, logic program) is a pair Π = (A, R), where A is a set of propositional (i.e. ground) atoms and R is a set of rules of the form a 1 ∨ · · · ∨ a l ← a l+1 , . . . , a m , ¬ℓ 1 , . . . , ¬ℓ n ; (3) where the comma symbol stands for conjunction, 0 ≤ l ≤ m, 0 ≤ n, a i ∈ A for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and each ℓ i is a literal, that is, either an atom a or its (default) negation ¬a for any atom a ∈ A. Note that, therefore, doubly negated atoms may occur. We will sometimes refer to such rules as standard rules. Each rule r ∈ R of form (3) consists of a head H (r) = {a 1 , . . . , a l } and a body B (r) = {a l+1 , . . . , a m , ¬ℓ 1 , . . . , ¬ℓ n }. We denote the positive body by B + (r) = {a l+1 , . . . , a m }. An interpretation I (over A) is a set of atoms, that is, I ⊆ A. A literal ℓ is true in an interpretation I ⊆ A, denoted I ℓ, if a ∈ I and ℓ = a, or if a ∈ I and ℓ = ¬a; otherwise ℓ is false in I, denoted I ℓ. Finally, for some literal ℓ, we define that I ¬ℓ if I ℓ. This notation naturally extends to sets of literals. An interpretation M is called a model of r, denoted M r, if, whenever M B (r), it holds that M H (r). We denote the set of models of r by mods(r); the models of a logic program Π = (A, R) are given by mods(Π) = r∈R mods(r). We also write I r (resp. I Π) if I ∈ mods(r) (resp. I ∈ mods(Π)).
The GL-reduct Π I of a logic program Π = (A, R) with respect to an interpretation I is the program (A, R I ), where (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Lifschitz, Tang, and Turner 1999 
The set of answer sets of a logic program Π is denoted by AS (Π). The consistency problem of ASP, that is, to decide whether for a given logic program Π it holds that AS (Π) = ∅, is Σ 2 P -complete (Eiter and Gottlob 1995) , and remains so also in the case where doubly negated atoms are allowed in rule bodies (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009) .
Strong Equivalence for Logic Programs. Two logic programs Π 1 = (A, R 1 ) and Π 2 = (A, R 2 ) are equivalent iff they have the same set of answer sets, that is, AS (Π 1 ) = AS (Π 2 ). The two logic programs are strongly equivalent iff for any third logic program Π = (A, R) it holds that the combined logic program Π 1 ∪ Π = (A, R 1 ∪ R) is equivalent to the combined logic program Π 2 ∪ Π = (A, R 2 ∪ R). Note that strong equivalence implies equivalence, since the empty program Π = (A, ∅) would already contradict strong equivalence for two non-equivalent programs Π 1 and Π 2 .
An SE-model (Turner 2003 ) of a logic program Π = (A, R) is a tuple (X, Y ), where X ⊆ Y ⊆ A, Y Π, and X Π Y . The set of SE-models of a logic program Π is denoted SE(Π). Note that for every model
Y . Two logic programs (over the same atoms) are strongly equivalent iff they have the same SE-models (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001; Turner 2003) . Checking whether two logic programs are strongly equivalent is CONP-complete (Turner 2003; Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009) .
Epistemic Logic Programs. An epistemic literal is a formula not ℓ, where ℓ is a literal and not is the epistemic negation operator. A ground epistemic logic program (ELP) is a triple Π = (A, E, R), where A is a set of propositional atoms, E is a set of epistemic literals over the atoms A, and R is a set of ELP rules, which are
where each a i ∈ A is an atom, each ℓ i is a literal, and each ξ i ∈ E is an epistemic literal. Note that usually E is defined implicitly to be the set of all epistemic literals appearing in the rules R; however, making the domain of epistemic literals explicit will prove useful for our purposes. The union of two ELPs
For a set E of epistemic literals, a subset Φ ⊆ E of epistemic literals is called an epistemic guess (or, simply, a guess). The following definition provides a way to check whether a set of interpretations is compatible with a guess Φ. Definition 2. Let A be a set of atoms, E be a set of epistemic literals over A, and Φ ⊆ E be an epistemic guess. A set I of interpretations over A is called Φ-compatible w.r.t. E, iff 1. I = ∅; 2. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ Φ, there exists an interpretation I ∈ I such that I ℓ; and 3. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ E \ Φ, for all interpretations I ∈ I it holds that I ℓ.
For an ELP Π = (A, E, R), the epistemic reduct (Shen and Eiter 2016) of the program Π w.r.t. a guess Φ, denoted Π Φ , consists of the rules R Φ = {r ¬ | r ∈ R}, where r ¬ is defined as the rule r ∈ R where all occurrences of epistemic literals not ℓ ∈ Φ are replaced by ⊤, and all remaining epistemic negation symbols not are replaced by default negation ¬. Note that, after this transformation, Let us reconsider the CWA formulations as examples.
We obtain cwv ( (Lifschitz, Tang, and Turner 1999) , such formulas are equivalent to simple negated atoms ¬a, and we treat them as such.
Following the principle of knowledge minimization, Shen and Eiter (2016) define a world view as follows.
Note that in Example 4 there is only one CWV per program; hence the associated guesses are subset-maximal, and the sets of CWVs and WVs coincide.
One of the main reasoning tasks regarding ELPs is the world view existence problem, that is, given an ELP Π, decide whether a WV (or, equivalently, CWV) exists. This problem is Σ P 3 -complete (Shen and Eiter 2016) . We close this section with a statement that shows that extending A or E of an ELP does not change their CWVs (and hence also not their WVs).
Theorem 6. Let Π = (A, E, R) be an ELP and let Π ′ = (A ′ , E ′ , R) be an ELP with the same set of rules, but with
The proof can be found in Appendix A. The above theorem implies that, given two ELPs Π 1 = (A 1 , E 1 , R 1 ) and Π 2 = (A 2 , E 2 , R 2 ), we can always assume that A 1 = A 2 and E 1 = E 2 (since the domains can be extended without changing the CWVs, as per the above theorem).
Strong Equivalence for ELPs
In this section, we will investigate notions of equivalence of ELPs, in particular, focusing on how to extend the concept of strong equivalence (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001; Turner 2003 ) from logic programs to ELPs. We will start by defining (ordinary) equivalence of two ELPs.
Definition 7. Two ELPs are WV-equivalent (resp. CWVequivalent) iff their WVs (resp. CWVs) coincide.
We observe that CWV-equivalence is the stronger notion, as it immediately implies WV-equivalence. Moreover, for two ELPs to be equivalent as defined above, not only must the set of guesses leading to WVs/CWVs be the same, but also the answer sets in each of these WVs/CWVs.
We now continue by defining strong equivalence for ELPs. One motivation for such a kind of equivalence is modularization: we want to be able to replace a sub-program by another one such that the semantics (i.e. WVs or CWVs) of the overall program does not change. Based on the two equivalence notions defined above and using ideas from work done in the area of logic programs ), we propose four notions of strong equivalence for ELPs. Having defined these equivalence notions for ELPs, the main aim of this section is to characterize strong equivalence in a similar fashion as was done for logic programs by Turner (2003) . Note that one could be tempted to define strong equivalence for ELPs simply in terms of Turner's SEmodels of the epistemic reducts, for each possible epistemic guess. However, this approach does not capture our intentions, as the following example shows: Example 9. Take the two ELPs Π 1 = (A, E, R 1 ) and Π 2 = (A, E, R 2 ) with R 1 = {p ← not p}, R 2 = {p ← ¬p} and E = {not p}. Now, for the guess The example above implies that, when establishing strong equivalence for ELPs, we should discard guesses that can never give rise to a CWV. We formalize this as follows: Definition 10. Let I be a set of interpretations over a domain of atoms A, let E be a set of epistemic literals over A, and Φ ⊆ E be a guess. Then, Φ is realizable in I iff there is a subset
Given an ELP Π = (A, E, R) and a guess Φ ⊆ E, we say that Φ is realizable in Π iff Φ is realizable in the set of models of Π Φ . We say that Φ is realizable in a set of SE-models S iff Φ is realizable in the set {Y | (X, Y ) ∈ S}. We are now ready to define our central construct, the SE-function SE Π of an ELP, which will be the key concept to characterize strong equivalence for ELPs. Note that realizability plays an important role in this. Definition 11. The SE-function SE Π (·) of an ELP Π = (A, E, R) maps guesses Φ ⊆ E for Π to sets of SE-models as follows. 
. Before proceeding to our main results, we first state some observations that can be made about the SE-function of an ELP. Lemma 13. Let Π = (A, E, R) be an ELP with SE Π its SE-function. Further, let M be a set of interpretations, and
Proof. The left-to-right direction can be shown as follows. By definition of the SE-function it holds that for each CWV M w.r.t. a guess Φ for Π, SE Π (Φ) contains the set {(Y, Y ) | Y ∈ M}, and, since M contains only answer sets of the epistemic reduct Π Φ , there cannot be a pair (X, Y ) in SE Π (Φ) with X ⊂ Y . There also cannot be some other Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (4), (1) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (4). These follow directly from Definition 8 and from the fact that every WV is a CWV and every ASP program is an ELP. (5) ⇒ (1). Assume that statement (5) holds. We need to show that for any third program Π it holds that Π 1 ∪ Π and Π 2 ∪ Π are equivalent. To this end, pick any guess Φ. Then,
since SE Π1 (Φ) = SE Π2 (Φ) by assumption, and thus
. Lemma 14 then proves that Π 1 ∪ Π and Π 2 ∪ Π are equivalent. (4) ⇒ (5). We will prove the contrapositive. Let Π 1 = (A 1 , E 1 , R 1 ) and Π 2 = (A 2 , E 2 , R 2 ) be two ELPs and assume, w.l.o.g., that A 1 = A 2 = A and E 1 = E 2 = E (cf. Theorem 6). Further, let Φ ⊆ E be a guess such that
by symmetry). We need to show that there exists a logic program Π (i.e. without epistemic literals) such that the WVs of the ELP Π 1 ∪ Π differ from those of Π 2 ∪ Π. We only need to consider the case where Π 1 and Π 2 are WV-equivalent, since the claim is trivially true otherwise.
By Definition 11, with Y 1 non-empty by assumption, there is a subset
A \ C. The idea is to construct Π in such a way that the potential WV represented by C is actually realized in Π 1 ∪ Π. To construct Π, let y 1 , . . . , y n be fresh atoms not occurring in A. Let Π contain the rule y 1 ∨ . . . ∨ y n ← ⊤, and, furthermore, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a ∈ Y i , the rule ⊥ ← y i , ¬a, and for all a ∈ A \ Y i , the rule ⊥ ← y i , a. This makes sure that for every model
answer sets, and all other models are destroyed, except for
At this point, if we have that
, we simply do the same as above also for the model
Φ will have the answer sets {Y 1 ∪{y 1 }, . . . , Y m ∪{y m }} which form a CWV of Π 1 ∪ Π, but not of Π 2 ∪ Π. Since all other models are destroyed, independent of the guess Φ, this CWV is actually the only CWV of Π 1 ∪ Π, and hence, it is a WV, proving our claim that Π 1 ∪ Π and Π 2 ∪ Π are not WV-equivalent (⋆). It therefore remains to show the claim for the case where the set {Y 1 , . . . , Y m } ⊆ mods(Π Φ 2 ). To this end, we need to distinguish the following two cases:
. In this case, for each atom a ∈ X, add the rule a ← y k to Π, and, in addition, for all atoms a, b ∈ Y \ X, add the rule a ← b, y k to Π. We will show that, in this case, Y is an answer set of (Π 2 ∪ Π)
Φ , but not of
and every model of a program is also a model of its GL-reduct, by definition of SE-models we know that Y = X, since, by assumption,
Y and therefore Y ∪ {y k } is not an answer set of (Π 1 ∪ Π)
Φ . On the other hand, for (Π 2 ∪Π) Φ , assume that there is some
Clearly, by construction of Π, X ⊂ X ′ . Thus, there is some atom a in X ′ ⊆ Y but not in X. But, by construction of Π, we then have that
Hence, Y ∪ {y k } is an answer set of (Π 2 ∪ Π) Φ , as desired.
The above shows that, for both cases (1) and (2), the set C ′ = {Y 1 ∪ {y 1 }, . . . , Y m ∪ {y m }} is the set of answer sets of one of the two programs (Π 1 ∪ Π) Φ and (Π 2 ∪ Π) Φ , and therefore, by assumption, a CWV of that program. But, by construction of Π, C ′ cannot be a CWV for the other program (because Y ∪ {y k } is an answer set of one of the two programs, but not both, and hence distinguishes the CWVs) 3 . It remains to show that C ′ is not only a CWV but also a WV of exactly one of the two programs, which can be done via the argument for (⋆). This concludes the proof.
The above theorem states that the SE-function precisely characterizes all the notions of strong equivalence for ELPs and that these notions are all equivalent. We therefore will, from now on, jointly refer to these four equivalent notions as strong equivalence. 
We observe that cwv (Π G ∪ Π) = {{{p}}} (due to guess {not p}) and cwv (Π S ∪ Π) = {{{p ′ }}} (due to guess {not ¬p}).
We close this section by showing that our definition of strong equivalence for ELPs generalizes the established notion of strong equivalence for logic programs. 
Complexity of ELP Strong Equivalence
We now make use of our characterization to settle the computational complexity of deciding strong equivalence between ELPs. The following lemma shows that to check the realizability of a guess Φ for a given ELP Π it suffices to consider a polynomially-sized subset of the models of Π. each
′ such that ℓ is false in Y not ℓ . Take the subset C ⊆ C ′ containing Y not ℓ for each not ℓ ∈ E, or, if Φ = ∅, let C be any singleton subset of C ′ . Note that C is of polynomial size in Π. Clearly, C is also compatible with Φ.
With this crucial observation in place, we are now ready to state the complexity of checking strong equivalence for ELPs, which remains in CONP as for plain logic programs. This is surprising, since reasoning tasks for ELPs generally are one level higher on the polynomial hierarchy than the corresponding tasks for logic programs (cf. Section 2). CONP-complete. Proof. We give a non-deterministic polynomial time procedure for checking that two ELPs are not strongly equivalent, that is, that there is a difference in their respective SE-functions. W.l.o.g. let Π 1 = (A, E, R 1 ) and Π 2 = (A, E, R 2 ). The procedure works as follows:
Theorem 20. Checking whether two ELPs are strongly equivalent is
1. Guess an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E. 2. Guess a polynomially-sized, non-empty set of interpretations C over A, compatible with Φ. Clearly, the above procedure terminates in polynomial time, since it is known that model checking for SE-models can be done in polynomial time ). To obtain correctness, it is not difficult to verify that the above procedure is sound and complete given the following two observations. Firstly, note that Lemma 19 implies that we only need to focus on polynomially sized subsets when evaluating the realizability of a guess as stated in Definition 11; hence guessing a polynomially sized set of interpretations is enough in step 2. Secondly, assume that two programs Π 1 and Π 2 have differing SE-functions. Then this means that there must be some guess Φ, such that both sets SE Π1 (Φ) and SE Π2 (Φ) are non-empty (clearly, as otherwise SE Π1 (Φ) = SE Π2 (Φ) = ∅ for all guesses Φ). But, by Definition 11, this means that both sets contain a potential CWV. Now there are two cases: either they do not share any potential CWVs, or if they do, then there is at least one SE-model (X, Y ) contained in one but not both of the two sets.
Corollary 18 allows us to inherit the CONP lower bound from the case of logic programs (Pearce, Tompits, and Woltran 2009), which completes the proof.
Case Studies
In this section, we apply our characterisation to investigate basic principles for simplifying ELPs.
Tautological Rules
Tautological rules are rules that can simply be removed from any program without affecting its outcome.
Definition 21. An ELP rule r is tautological iff the singlerule ELP Π r = (A, E, {r}) is strongly equivalent to the empty program Π ∅ = (A, E, ∅).
Let E be a set of epistemic literals over A. We say that an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E is consistent iff, whenever E contains both not a and not ¬a for some atom a ∈ A, it holds that Φ contains at least one of {not a, not ¬a}. 4 Moreover, let S A denote the set of all pairs (X, Y ) such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ A.
Lemma 22. An ELP rule r is tautological iff for the singlerule ELP Π r = (A, E, {r}) it holds that SE Πr (Φ) = S A for each consistent guess Φ ⊆ E.
Proof. This follows from the fact that for the empty program Π ∅ = (A, E, ∅), SE Π ∅ (Φ) = S A for each consistent guess Φ ⊆ E, and the observation that if SE(Π Φ ) = S A , then Φ is realizable in Π.
Before syntactically characterizing tautological ELP rules, we recall a corresponding result for standard ASP rules from the literature. For convenience, we shall denote ASP rules of the form (3) as
using sets of atoms A, B, C, and D as is common practice.
In what follows, we denote single-rule logic programs consisting of a rule r by Π r = (A, R) with R = {r} and call r tautological if Π r is strongly equivalent to the empty program Π = (A, ∅), i.e. SE(Π r ) = S A . The following result is due to (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007, Lemma 2) .
Lemma 23. A rule r of the form (4) is tautological iff (α)
We are now ready to characterize tautological ELP rules. For the sake of presentation let us write them as
where, again, each capital letter represents a set of atoms, analogously to ASP rules of the form (4). Note that D here plays a different role than in (4); this is due to the fact that in ELP rules we have no explicit double negation.
Let us also consider the notion of epistemic reduct w.r.t. the above notation. Analogously to the ASP case, let Π r = (A, E, R) be the single-rule ELP with R = {r}. Now, for
We are now ready to give our full syntactical characterization of tautological ELP rules. It shows that deciding whether a rule is tautological amounts to a simple syntactic check and can be done individually, for each rule.
Theorem 24. An ELP rule r of form (5) is tautological iff (a)
Proof. Let Π r = (A, E, R) be the single-rule ELP with R = {r}, and, for an epistemic guess Φ, let r Φ denote the unqiue rule in R Φ in case R Φ = ∅.
(⇒) Let r be an ELP rule satisfying at least one of the conditions (a)-(f), and let Φ ⊆ E be a consistent guess. By Lemma 22, we have to show that either R Φ = ∅ or that r Φ fulfills the conditions of Lemma 23. This can be easily verified for conditions (a)-(c). For (d), note that if not f ∈ Φ for some f ∈ F we get R Φ = ∅; otherwise for all f ∈ F it holds that not f / ∈ Φ, and thus that D ∩ F = ∅, and it follows that f ∈ D Φ for some f ∈ F . Hence we have ¬f and ¬¬f in r Φ , which is tautological as per Lemma 23, condition (γ). The argument is similar for (e), Finally, for (f) note that since Φ is consistent, it must contain one of not a and not ¬a for each a ∈ F ∩ G. It follows that R Φ = ∅.
(⇐) Let r be an ELP rule such that none of (a)-(f) hold. Let Φ = E \(not F ∪not ¬G). Φ is consistent since (f) does not hold. Moreover, not D ∪not ¬E ⊆ Φ (since neither (d) nor (e) holds). Suppose, Φ is realizable in Π r . By construction of Φ, R Φ = {A ← B, ¬C, ¬¬F, ¬G}; by Lemma 23 and the fact that (α)-(γ) of that lemma do not hold for r Φ , we have that r Φ is not tautological, i.e. SE(Π r Φ ) = S A , and thus SE Πr (Φ) = S A . Otherwise, we get SE Πr (Φ) = ∅. Hence, for both cases, r is not tautological by Lemma 22.
Rule Subsumption
Rule subsumption identifies when a rule s can safely be removed from a program Π, given another rule r is in Π. Definition 25. An ELP rule s is subsumed by an ELP rule r iff Π r is strongly equivalent to Π r ∪ Π s .
The next result follows from the definition of the SEfunction for a union of two ELPs (cf. proof of Theorem 15). Lemma 26. An ELP rule s is subsumed by an ELP rule r iff, for ELPs Π r = (A, E, {r}) and Π s = (A, E, {s}), it holds that SE Πr (Φ) ⊆ SE Πs (Φ), for all guesses Φ ⊆ E.
Clearly, a tautological rule s is subsumed by any other rule, hence in what follows we focus on subsumption of non-tautological rules only. Again, we exploit known results from ASP. With some abuse of terminology, we say that an ASP rule r subsumes another such rule s iff Π r = (A, {r}) is strongly equivalent to Π r,s = (A, {r, s}), i.e. iff SE(Π r ) ⊆ SE(Π s ). We first adapt a result from (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007 , Theorem 7) to our notation. Lemma 27. An ASP rule r = A ← B, ¬C, ¬¬D subsumes a non-tautological ASP rule
We can now give a syntactic criterion for ELP rule subsumption, which turns out to be somewhat involved, but still feasible to check. It requires two technical notions that link a rule r to a rule s whenever r has sufficiently many elements that are not "absorbed" by default-negated epistemic literals in s.
We are now ready to give our syntactic characterization.
Theorem 28. Let r be an ELP-rule of form (5) and s
= A ′ ← B ′ , ¬C ′ , not D ′ , not ¬E ′ , ¬not F ′ , ¬not ¬G ′ be non-tautological. Furthermore, let r s denote that |(A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G ′ | > 1 or (B ∪ E) \ F ′ = ∅, and r s denote that (A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G ′ = ∅ or |(B ∪ E) \ F ′ | > 1.
Then, r subsumes s iff the following conditions jointly hold: (a)
Note that, in the above, items (a)-(d) generalize the same items in Lemma 27, and the proof for those parts is a generalization of the proof of that lemma. The full proof can be found in Appendix B.
Interestingly, applying the above theorem shows, for example, that r = p ← not p subsumes s = p ← ¬p and vice versa (in particular, since neither r s nor s r), showing that the two programs in Example 9 are strongly equivalent.
Conclusions
In this paper, a simple characterization of strong equivalence for epistemic logic programs was proposed, which also demonstrates that various notions of strong equivalence coincide. The characterization generalizes strong equivalence for plain logic programs, and, somewhat unexpectedly, shows that checking strong equivalence for ELPs is not harder than for ASP in terms of computational complexity. The results also give rise to a syntactic characterization of tautological ELP rules and ELP rule subsumption.
As another byproduct, we studied the relationship between two formalizations of CWA, Gelfond-CWA and ShenEiter-CWA, as our running example. Indeed, while they are (ordinarily) equivalent, they are not strongly equivalent, as shown in Examples 12 and 17. In particular, Example 17 shows that, combining Π in that example with the Shen-Eiter-CWA rule, yields the world view {{p ′ }}, which does not seem intuitive in this setting. However, in (Shen and Eiter 2016) , it seems that the CWA rule is proposed for Reiter's CWA (Reiter 1977) , and thus was not intended to work with rules containing default negation.
For future work, we want to apply our findings to obtain a normal form for ELPs, as was done for ASP in (Cabalar, Pearce, and Valverde 2007) . Furthermore, we plan to study weaker forms of equivalence for ELPs. In particular, it will be interesting to see whether our notion of SE-functions can be similarly re-used for characterizing uniform equivalence like SE-models did serve as a basis for UE-models.
A Proof of Theorem 6
We start by re-stating a folklore result from the world of ASP, namely that the universe of atoms of a logic program can be extended without changing its answer sets. It is easy to see that the above proposition holds by noting that any atom a ∈ A ′ \ A can clearly not appear in the rules R, and hence any such a must be false in any answer set of Π ′ (i.e. for all M ∈ AS (Π ′ ) it holds that a ∈ M ). From this result, it is easy to obtain a similar result for ELPs.
Proposition 30. Let Π = (A, E, R) be an ELP and let
R) be an ELP with the same set of rules and domain of epistemic literals, but with
Proof. Note that, clearly, any atom a ∈ A ′ \A cannot appear anywhere in R or E. Hence, for every guess Φ ⊆ E, a also does not appear in the rules of the epistemic reduct Π ′Φ and thus also not in any answer set of
From the above, we can see that the atom domain of an ELP can be arbitrarily extended without changing the CWVs of the ELP. We will now show that the same is the case for the domain of epistemic literals.
Proposition 31. Let Π = (A, E, R) be an ELP and let Π ′ = (A, E ′ , R) be an ELP with the same set of rules and atom domain, but with E ′ ⊃ E and
Proof. Note that the epistemic literal not ℓ cannot appear anywhere in R, but the atom in ℓ can be in A and appear in R. Now consider any guess Φ ⊆ E, which we will relate to Φ ′ = Φ ∪ {not ℓ}. The rules of the epistemic reducts Π Φ , Π ′Φ , and Π
First, consider the case that M is not compatible with Φ, it is not hard to see that then M is not compatible with Φ ′ either. Now assume that M is compatible with Φ, and thus M ∈ cwv (Π). We distinguish two cases: (1) ∀M ∈ M : M ℓ, in this case Φ is compatible with M (with respect to E ′ ) and therefore M ∈ cwv (Π ′ ); (2) ∃M ∈ M : M ℓ, in this case Φ ′ is compatible with M and thus M ∈ cwv (Π ′ ).
From Propositions 30 and 31 in that order, and their respective proofs, Theorem 6 follows.
B Proof of Theorem 28
Let Π r = (A, E, R r ) and Π s = (A, E, R s ) be the two single rule ELPs with R r = {r} and R s = {s}, and let r Φ and s Φ be as in the previous section (cf. the paragraph before Theorem 24).
(⇐) Let r, s be such that (a)-(e) hold. By Lemma 26 we need to show that SE Πr (Φ) ⊆ SE Πs (Φ), for all guesses Φ ⊆ E. If Φ is not consistent SE Πr (Φ) ⊆ SE Πs (Φ) holds by trivial means. Hence, let Φ ⊆ E be consistent. If Π We continue to show that either Φ is not realizable in Π r , or r Φ and s Φ fulfill the conditions (α)-(δ) of Lemma 27. Recall that we assume that r Φ and s Φ exist, i.e. the epistemic reducts are not empty. Hence,
In fact, the epistemic reducts are of the form
We first show that condition (δ) of Lemma 27 holds for r Φ and s Φ . Observe that for each e ∈ E Φ with e ∈ E ′ , also e ∈ E ′Φ . Hence from (d) we get
We continue with condition (γ) of Lemma 27. Suppose it does not hold for r Φ and s Φ . We have to show that SE Πr (Φ) = ∅. Since the condition does not hold for r
We show that no subset of models of r Φ is Φ-compatible. First, observe that we would need for each such model that all f ∈ F ′ are set ot true and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Since not c ∈ Φ, we need among those models one that sets c to false. However, such a model does not exist: the only "positive" atoms in r Φ besides c occur also in G ′ and are already set to false; all "negative" atoms in r Φ are also in F ′ and thus are set to true. Hence, SE Πr (Φ) = ∅.
Next, we treat condition (β) of Lemma 27. Suppose it does not hold for r Φ and s Φ . Again, we need to show SE Πr (Φ) = ∅. Since the condition does not hold for r Φ and
Since we assume by 
We show that no subset of models of r Φ is Φ-compatible. First, observe that we would need for each such model that all f ∈ F ′ are set ot true and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Since not ¬b ∈ Φ, we need among those models one that sets b to true. However, such a model does not exist: all "positive" atoms in r Φ occur also in G ′ and are already set to false; the only "negative" atoms in r Φ different to b are also in F ′ and thus are set to true. Hence, SE Πr (Φ) = ∅.
For Condition (β') of Lemma 27, once more suppose that is does not hold for r Φ and s Φ . We have
and, since (b * ') holds, r s. On the other hand, since (b') holds, we know that for each x ∈ X, x ∈ D ′ and, hence not x ∈ Φ (since X does not contain an element from D ′Φ ). Fix some a ∈ X. From r s it follows that there is neither an element in (A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G ′ that is different from a nor is there an element in B ∪ E different from F ′ . We show that no subset of models of r Φ is Φ-compatible. First, observe that we would need for each such model that all f ∈ F ′ are set ot true and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Since not a ∈ Φ, we need among those models one that sets a to false. However, such a model does not exist: the only "positive" atoms in r Φ besides a occur also in G ′ and are already set to false; all "negative" atoms in r Φ are also in F ′ and thus are set to true. Hence, SE Πr (Φ) = ∅. It remains to show that condition (α) of Lemma 27 applies to r Φ and s Φ . The argument is similar to the one for condition (γ). So, suppose the condition does not hold for r Φ and s Φ , i.e. we have
From r s, it follows that there is neither an element in (A∪C ∪D)\G ′ that is different from a nor is there an element in B ∪ E different from F ′ . Showing that no subset of models of r Φ is Φ-compatible follows essentially the same arguments as used for condition (c) above. Hence, we end up with SE Πr (Φ) = ∅ as desired. This concludes the proof of the only-if direction.
(⇒) Suppose one of the conditions (a)-(e) is violated. We show that there exists a guess Φ, such that SE Πr (Φ) ⊆ SE Πs (Φ).
Let us first consider (e) is violated and let
′ and E ′ dissappear since we assume s to be nontautological). It can be checked that, since s is nontautological, so is s Φ , and thus SE Πs (Φ) ⊂ S A . For the remaining cases, let us assume (e) holds. Note that then r Φ is non-empty as well. In fact, it is of the form We thus take I as the set of interpretations where e is set to false, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Indeed, I ⊆ mods(r Ψ ) since I is a set of well-formed interpretations (recall that e / ∈ F ′ , and F ′ ∩ G ′ = ∅ since we assumed s to be nontautological). We show that the three conditions for I being Ψ-compatible hold. (i) I = ∅ by definition; (ii) for any not ℓ ∈ Ψ, there exists an I ∈ I, such that I ℓ: by definition ℓ / ∈ {¬e} ∪ F ′ ∪ ¬G ′ . For ℓ = e, I e hold for all I ∈ I. Similary this is true for ℓ ∈ ¬F ′ and for all ℓ ∈ G ′ . For all other ℓ such that not ℓ ∈ Ψ, there is one I ∈ I such that I ℓ by construction of I; (iii) we show that for any not ℓ ∈ E \ Ψ, and for each each I ∈ I, I ℓ. Indeed, by construction of Ψ, ℓ is either ¬e, f ∈ F ′ or ¬g ∈ ¬G ′ ; by definition, for each I ∈ I it holds that I ℓ.
Suppose (c) is violated. We consider Ψ = Φ \ {not c}
We observe that condition (γ) of Lemma 27 is thus violated, and, by the same lemma, we get that SE(Π Ψ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Ψ s ). It remains to show that Ψ is realizable in mods(Π Ψ r ). Indeed, any interpretation that sets c to true is a model of r Ψ . We take I as the set of interpretations where c is set to true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. As before, one can show that I is a set of well-formed interpretations (in paricular, since c / ∈ G ′ ) and Ψ-compatible.
. Hence, (1) there exists at least one atom x different from c that appears in A ∪ C ∪ D but not in G ′ , or (2) there is some atom y in (B ∪ E) \ F ′ . Let ℓ = x for case (1) and ℓ = ¬y for case (2), and consider Ψ = Φ \ {not ℓ}. Since Ψ ⊆ Φ, r Ψ and s Ψ are non-empty. We observe that s Ψ = A ′ ← B ′ , ¬C ′ , ¬D ′Ψ , ¬¬E ′Ψ , ¬¬F ′ , ¬G ′ satisfies c / ∈ D ′Ψ (for case (1) recall that c = x). Hence, we have c ∈ C but c / ∈ C ′ ∪D ′Ψ ∪G ′ . As before, condition (γ) of Lemma 27 is thus violated, and we conclude SE(Π Ψ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Ψ s ). It remains to show that mods(Π Ψ r ) realizes Ψ. Here, any interpretation I that satisfies ℓ (i.e. where x ∈ I in case (1); otherwise y / ∈ I) is a model of r Ψ . We take I as the set of interpretations in which ℓ is true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Indeed, I contains well-formed interpretations, since x / ∈ G ′ and likewise, y / ∈ F ′ . As before, one can show that I is Ψ-compatible.
Suppose (b) is violated. We consider Ψ = Φ \ {not ¬b} with b ∈ B\(B ′ ∪E ′ ∪F ′ ). Since Ψ ⊆ Φ, r Ψ and s Ψ are nonempty. In fact, s Ψ = s Φ since b / ∈ E ′ . Thus, condition (β) of Lemma 27 is violated, and, by the same lemma, we have SE(Π Ψ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Ψ s ). It remains to show that mods(Π Ψ r ) realizes Ψ. Indeed, any interpretation that sets b to false is a model of r Ψ . We take I as the set of interpretations where b is set to false, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. This is again sound since b / ∈ F ′ . As before, one can show that I is Ψ-compatible.
Suppose (b * ) is violated, i.e. we have (A∪C ∪D)\G ′ = ∅ or |(B∪E)\F ′ | > 1, but B ⊆ B ′ ∪F ′ . Let b ∈ B\(B ′ ∪F ′ ). Hence, there exists (1) an atom x in (A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G ′ , or (2) an atom y different to b that appears in (B ∪ E) \ F ′ . Let ℓ = x in case (1) and ℓ = ¬y in case (2), and consider Ψ = Φ\{not ℓ}. Since Ψ ⊆ Φ, r Ψ and s Ψ are non-empty. We observe that s Ψ = A ′ ← B ′ , ¬C ′ , ¬D ′Ψ , ¬¬E ′Ψ , ¬¬F ′ , ¬G ′ satisfies b / ∈ E ′Ψ (for case (2) recall that b = y). Hence, we have b ∈ B but b / ∈ B ′ ∪ E ′Ψ ∪ F ′ . As before, condition (β) of Lemma 27 is violated, and we conclude SE(Π Ψ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Ψ s ). It remains to show that mods(Π Ψ r ) realizes Ψ. Here, any interpretation that sets ℓ to true (i.e. x is set true in case (1); otherwise y is set to false) is a model of r Ψ . We take I as the set of all interpretations wherein ℓ is true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. Indeed, I contains well-formed interpretations, since x / ∈ G ′ and likewise, y / ∈ F ′ . One can show that I is Ψ-compatible by the usual argument.
Suppose (b') is violated, i.e. we have X = A∩(A ′ \ (C ′ ∪ D ′ ∪G ′ )) = ∅ and B ⊆ B ′ . Consider Ψ = Φ\ {not a} with a ∈ X. In particular, this implies a / ∈ D ′ . Since Ψ ⊆ Φ, r Ψ and s Ψ are non-empty. In fact, s Ψ = s Φ since a / ∈ D ′ . We observe that condition (β ′ ) of Lemma 27 is thus violated, and, by the same lemma, we get that SE(Π Ψ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Ψ s ). It remains to show that mods(Π Ψ r ) realizes Ψ. Indeed, any interpretation that sets a to true is a model of r Ψ . We take I as the set of interpretations where a is set to true, all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false. This is again sound since a / ∈ G ′ (by construction of X). Suppose (b * ') is violated, i.e. |(A ∪ C ∪ D) \ G ′ | > 1 or (B ∪ E) \ F ′ = ∅, as well as X = A ∩ (A ′ \ (C ′ ∪ G ′ )) = ∅ and B ⊆ B ′ . For this case, we consider the rules r Φ and s Φ directly. In fact, for these rules, X and B ⊆ B ′ immediately imply that condition (β ′ ) of Lemma 27 is violated, and we conclude SE(Π Φ r ) ⊆ SE(Π Φ s ). We show that M = mods(Π Φ r ) realizes Φ. Note that in this particular case, r Φ has at least two literals not "absorbed" by F ′ and G ′ ; viz. x ∈ X and some ℓ = x from (A∪C∪D)\(G ′ ∪{x}) or from (B ∪ E) \ F ′ . If we consider the set M ′ ⊆ M of models where all f ∈ F ′ are set to true, and all g ∈ G ′ are set to false, we observe that for all other atoms y, there exists at least one model in M ′ where y is set to false and another one where y is set to true. In particular, there is an M ∈ M where x is false (namely the one where ℓ is set to true), and likewise there is an M ∈ M where ℓ is false (namely the one where x is set to true).
Cases (a) and (a * ) are similar to (c) and (c * ): simply apply Lemma 27 via condition (α) instead of (γ).
